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I. INTRODUCTION
At a recent en banc meeting of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, District Judge Charles A. Shaw com-
plained about the "overabundance" of employment discrimination
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TITLE VII JURY INSTRUCTIONS
cases on his docket. Fellow Judge George F. Gunn quipped in reply,
"You mean you have other kinds of cases?"'
Employment discrimination is one of the fastest growing areas of
civil litigation, and courts report that they are being "swamped" with
these claims. 2 Motivated in part by a desire to assist litigants through
the labyrinth of employment discrimination law, and in part by a need
to control their dockets, district courts in the Eighth Circuit have be-
gun to develop standardized forms for use in these cases.3 One of the
innovations in standardization is the Manual of Model Civil Jury In-
structions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 4 (Model
Instructions).
Many, if not all district courts and lawyers consult the Model In-
structions when drafting the charges that will guide a jury's delibera-
tions. Nevertheless, although they are standardized, the accuracy of
the Model Instructions is not guaranteed. This no doubt will come as
a surprise to some readers. Common among courts and practitioners
is the misconception that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit plays some role in formulating or approving the Model
Instructions.5 In fact, these pattern instructions are drafted by a com-
mittee, and no member of the Court of Appeals participates in the
work of that committee. The court does not promulgate these instruc-
tions, and it "approve[s] of the model instructions only as they are in-
dividually litigated and upheld by th[e] court on a case-by-case
basis."6 Thus, it is important that scholars and practitioners, particu-
larly those within the Eighth Circuit, critically examine these
instructions.
This Article undertakes such an inquiry, scrutinizing the charge
recommended by the Model Instructions in Title VII disparate treat-
ment claims. The examination begins with a brief review of two Title
VII metaphors: pretext and mixed-motive disparate treatment dis-
crimination claims. It then reviews the changes made to those meta-
phors by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.7 Part IV scrutinizes the
disparate treatment jury charge recommended by the Model Instruc-
1. Ellen F. Harris, "Non-Specialists" Join in Discrimination Suit Boom, NEW-
SWATcH, July 21, 1997, at 7 (on file with the Nebraska Law Review).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., id. (reporting the development of standard discovery requests for em-
ployment discrimination cases).
4. COMMITEE ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE EIGHTH CIRcurT,
MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
EIGMrH CiRcurr (1995)[hereinafter MODEL INSTRUCTIONS].
5. Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1216, 1221 n.2 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 714 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995).
6. United States v. Ali, 63 F.3d 710, 714 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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tions, and Part V discusses why the instructions are erroneous. Next,
the Article examines cases from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
and other United States Courts of Appeals, concluding that the Model
Instructions are inconsistent with these precedents. Finally, this Ar-
ticle proposes an improved formula jury instruction along with an al-
ternative interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT METAPHORS
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers to "discriminate ... be-
cause of' an employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."8
The statute does not define "discriminate,"9 so the courts have devel-
8. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(a) (1994). Portions of Title
VII are incorporated into other civil rights and antidiscrimination statutes. For
example, the Americans with Disabilities Act incorporates the "powers, remedies,
and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 20OO0e-8, and
2000e-9" of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) shares virtually identical core language. Compare id.
§ 20O0e-2(a), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994). The ADEA also has been inter-
preted using Title VII precedent as an analog. See Howard Eglit, The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three
Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1096-106
(1993)(describing "tandem development" of Title VII and ADEA). Title IX also is
interpreted in accordance with Title VII precedent. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch.
Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996). Changes to Title VIIs wording or inter-
pretation generally affect these "linked statutes" as well. See John L. Flynn,
Note, Mixed-Motive Causation under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking,
and Clear Statements, 83 GEo. L.J. 2009 (1995).
9. Actually, all employers discriminate every day in the sense that the employer
treats employees differently: some workers are given promotions, raises, or desir-
able work while others are demoted, fired, or disciplined. Thus, everyone has
been the victim of discrimination at some point. The relevant legal question is
whether the employer has engaged in prohibited discrimination. Discrimination
is illegal under Title VII only when it is because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
An interpretative memorandum issued by Senators Case and Clark,
comanagers of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the Senate during the legislative
debates on the Act, makes clear that "[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in
treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are those which are based
on any of the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex and national origin."
110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964)(statement of Sen. Clark).
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oped a sophisticated body of law designed to distinguish unlawful dis-
crimination from legitimate employment decisions. These precedents
rely on the use of different models or metaphors for illegal discrimina-
tion. As a result, this jurisprudence has resembled an amoeba: dis-
crimination was the starting point, which Congress then split into two
types-lawful and unlawful. Unlawful discrimination then itself di-
vided into two types of prohibited conduct-disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment. Each of those cells then split, and so on. The Model
Instructions abolish the distinction between two of these "cells."lo To
see the importance of these instructions, the categories' evolution
must be traced.
The first junction of Title VII case law deals with two different
kinds of alleged discrimination as created by the United States
Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States.l The Court distinguished "disparate treatment" from "dispa-
rate impact" discrimination. 12 An employer engages in disparate im-
pact discrimination when it adopts policies that burden protected
employees more than others.13 An employer engages in disparate
treatment discrimination when it makes individual employment deci-
sions based on prohibited criteria.14
The most common type of Title VII litigation involves disparate
treatment discrimination. 15 As the volume of this litigation increased,
courts divided approaches to the applicable theory into two classes-
10. See MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 83-86 (introductory note).
11. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
12. The Court explains the two categories as follows:
"Disparate treatment"... is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress 'disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required
under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. at 335 n.15 (citations omitted).
13. For the archetypical disparate impact case, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971)(holding that an employer who adopts employment tests unre-
lated to job performance violates Title VII when those tests operate to exclude a
protected class of employees).
14. For an example of disparate treatment, see UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499
U.S. 187 (1991)(holding that an employer violates Title VII when it prohibits fer-
tile women from holding certain jobs).
15. Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabili-
ties, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997)(pointing out that most Title VII cases in-
volve allegations of disparate treatment).
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pretext and mixed motive.' 6 It is the distinction between these two
claims that the Model Instructions incorrectly addresses.
A. Pretext
Under the pretext metaphor, plaintiffs argue that they were fired
because of some constitutionally protected characteristic, and any
other explanation offered by the employer simply is not true. These
claims, defined by the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green,17
proceed within a three-part framework.' 8 First, plaintiffs must prove
a prima facie case' 9 by establishing that (1) they are a member of a
protected class; (2) they are qualified for the job; (3) they were re-
jected; and (4) the job remained available and was later filled by a less
qualified applicant.20 In proving a prima facie case, the plaintiff cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that the employer violated Title VII.21
The defendant must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
16. The terms "pretext" and "mixed motive" are used more by historical accident than
because of their textual accuracy. The distinction does not depend on whether
single or multiple motives inspired an employment decision. Rather, the distinc-
tion ultimately hinges on the type and strength of the plaintiffs evidence of dis-
crimination. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. For an extended
discussion of the semantic flaws of these terms, see Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causa-
tion: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment
Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17, 23 (1991).
17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas was supplemented and explained in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
18. This process has been described in various colorful terms: a "minuet," Halsell v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1982), and Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv.
2229, 2232 & n.16 (1995); a "furious tennis match," Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and a game of"ping pong," Gudel, supra note 16, at
24.
19. The term "prima facie case" can create confusion because it is used in two differ-
ent ways. A "prima facie case" may mean that there is sufficient evidence to
withstand a directed verdict on an issue. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 450
n.4 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). In the Title VII context, however,
"prima facie case" means that the plaintiff has articulated enough evidence to
establish a legally rebuttable presumption of discrimination. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
20. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). These elements
may be adjusted to accommodate the plaintiffs allegations (failure to hire, failure
to promote, etc.).
21. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)("A prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on
the consideration of impermissible factors."). The assumption that unexplained
adverse employment action against minorities must be the result of improper dis-
crimination has been challenged as both inaccurate and unwise. See Malamud,
supra note 18, at 2254-62.
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reason for the adverse employment action 22 that rebuts the presump-
tion created by the plaintiffs prima facie case.23
Understanding the defendant's burden at this point is crucial. The
defendant merely must present admissible evidence that there is a
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 24 As the Supreme Court re-
cently made clear in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,25 however, at
no time during a pretext case does a defendant have to prove it did not
discriminate. 2 6 Thus, in a pretext claim, the fact-finder can conclude
that the defendant's explanation is not the true reason it acted and yet
find that the employer did not violate Title VII. The Court empha-
sized that no authority supports imposing liability on a defendant
under Title VII unless a fact-finder determines that the employer un-
lawfully discriminated.
Therefore, the third step of a pretext claim is the place where
plaintiffs must do their real work: proving pretext. This burden may
be carried in any number of common sense ways: the plaintiff may
demonstrate that when making previous decisions, the employer
never relied on the offered explanation;2 7 the employer did not offer or
explain the reason to the plaintiff at the time of the action;28 or the
plaintiff had superior qualifications compared to the replacement
worker.2 9 In sum, the plaintiff must cast sufficient doubt on the de-
fendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons to allow the fact-finder
to conclude that a discriminatory motive more likely than not moti-
vated the defendant's actions.30 If the plaintiff establishes that the
true reason for the employer's action was based on a statutorily pro-
22. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55 (1981).
23. Id. at 255.
24. Id.
25. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
26. Id. at 519 ("It is not enough... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must
believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination."). For an ex-
tended analysis of the St. Mary's decision, see Ronald A. Schmidt, Note, The
Plaintiffs Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases: Discrimination Vel
Non-St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 73 NEB. L. REv. 953
(1994).
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Corley v. Jack-
son Police Dep't, 566 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126 (4th Cir. 1995); Lin-
dahl v. Air Fr., 930 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. See Norris v. Hartmarx Speciality Stores, Inc., 913 F.2d 253, 255-56 (5th Cir.
1990).
30. Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Pub. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 1996)(holding that
allegedly discriminatory comments are not enough to show that the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were
pretextual); Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308 (8th Cir. 1995)(holding
that the plaintiff had no evidence to prove that the defendant's refusal to promote
was pretextual and based on race).
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tected characteristic of the employee, the plaintiff will prevail under
the pretext metaphor.
B. Mixed Motives
Mixed-motives claims are both procedurally and factually much
different than pretext claims. The "mixed-motive problem" arises
when the plaintiff has "direct evidence"3 1 that an illegal factor played
a role in the employer's decision, yet the employer has evidence that
other, legal factors also played a role in its decision. The dilemma in a
mixed-motive case is not choosing whether to believe the employee's
story (religion motivated the demotion) or the employer's story (insub-
ordination motivated the demotion). The question is what to do when
religion and insubordination motivated the decision.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,32 the Supreme Court held33 that
mixed-motives claims could not be analyzed under the pretext model,
31. In applying Price Waterhouse before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the federal courts of appeals all agreed that some heightened evidentiary
showing was required to state a mixed-motive claim. The courts split, however,
on exactly what kind of evidence qualified. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, De-
spite the Smoke, There is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Mo-
tives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959,
970-79 (1994). The debate over what a plaintiff must do to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless,
"direct evidence" has been interpreted by the Eighth Circuit in the mixed-motive
context as follows: "evidence of'conduct or statements by persons involved in the
decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged dis-
criminatory attitude ... sufficient to permit the factfinder to find that that atti-
tude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision."
Kriss v. Sprint Communications Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1282 (8th Cir. 1995)(quoting
Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444,449 (8th Cir. 1993)(ADEA case)).
See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc., No. 97-1075, 1998 WL
122276, at *16-17 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1998).
32. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Much ink has been spilled attempting to explain and cri-
tique this decision. In addition to commentary cited elsewhere within this Arti-
cle, see Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990); William B. Gould IV, The
Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat
and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1485, 1499-503 (1990); Charles A.
Sullivan, Accounting For Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII, 56 BRooK. L. REV. 1107 (1991); Robert C. Johnson, Comment, Partner-
ship and Title VII Remedies: Price Waterhouse Cracks the Glass Ceiling, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 787; Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price
Waterhouse and the Individual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1023 (1990).
33. The Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse is complicated by its four sepa-
rate opinions. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion (writing for himself
and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); Justices White and O'Connor
concurred separately, and Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent (writing for himself,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia).
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but required their own metaphor.3 4 A majority of the Court agreed
that it would be unfair to force the plaintiff to prove that gender was
the reason the employer acted when the plaintiff already had
presented direct evidence that gender was a reason the employer ac-
ted.35 Instead, six Justices agreed that this stronger evidence36 justi-
fled shifting the ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant to
prove it did not discriminate. Thus, in mixed-motives cases, unlike
pretext cases, the defendant must prove it did not violate Title VII by
proving by "a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken the [prohibited characteris-
tic] into account."3 7
The dissent argued that it was unfair to create a class of discrimi-
nation claims wherein "it is not the plaintiff who must prove the exist-
ence of causation, but the defendant who must prove its absence."38
All of the Justices agreed, however, that an employer could avoid lia-
bility altogether if it proved that it would have made the same deci-
sion under the circumstances without considering the illegal
criteria.39
III. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
As a rule, plaintiffs fare better under a Price Waterhouse analysis
because the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the defendant.40
34. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989)(plurality opinion). See
also id. at 260 (White, J., concurring)(stating that "mixed-motives' cases, such as
the present one, are different from pretext cases"); id. at 278 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring)("Once all of the evidence has been received, the court should determine
whether the McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse framework properly applies
to the evidence before it.").
35. Id. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. The Supreme Court disagreed about what the plaintiff had to do to "shift" the
burden to the employer. The plurality stated that the burden shifted when the
plaintiff showed that "gender played a motivating part in an employment deci-
sion." Id. at 250 (plurality opinion). Justice White described the burden as re-
quiring the plaintiffto show "that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in
the adverse employment action." Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor's view was that the plaintiff had to present direct evidence of discrimi-
nation to shift to burden. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Most courts of
appeals have adopted O'Connor's direct evidence formulation. Zubrensky, supra
note 31.
37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)(plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
39. Despite the splintered Court, all unanimously agreed that an employer would be
relieved of all liability upon proof that the employer would have reached the same
decision without discriminatory animus. See id. at 250 (plurality opinion); id. at
261 n.* (White, J., concurring); id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 282
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(predicting that "every plaintiff is certain
to ask for a Price Waterhouse instruction").
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Yet, Price Waterhouse was viewed as a defense decision because an
employer could avoid liability altogether even when the plaintiff had
direct evidence of discriminatory animus.41 Unhappy with this aspect
of Price Waterhouse, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.42
The new law made several significant revisions to Title VII, two of
which impact the Eighth Circuit's Model Instructions. 43 First, Title
VII plaintiffs may now seek compensatory and punitive damages 44
and, if they do so, either party may request a trial by jury.45 Second,
unhappy with the result in Price Waterhouse, Congress changed the
structure of mixed-motive disparate treatment claims.46 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 added § 2000e-2(m) 4 7 to Title VII: "[An unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party dem-
onstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."48
The 1991 Act limits the relief available to plaintiffs who establish
liability under § 2000e-2(m) when the employer proves that it would
have made the same decision without considering the prohibited char-
acteristic. Under § 2000e-5, a court "shall not award damages or issue
an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion,
or payment" of backpay if the employer prevails on the same-decision
defense.49 Nevertheless, the court may award to plaintiffs declaratory
relief, injunctive relief,50 and attorney fees and costs. 5 1 Thus, the
41. See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Comment, A Unified Approach to Causation in
Disparate Treatment Cases: Using Sexual Harassment by Supervisors as the
Causal Nexus for the Discriminatory Motivating Factor in Mixed Motive Cases,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 231.
42. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552
(listing that one purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was "to respond to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring federal civil rights protections
against employment discrimination").
43. In addition to the changes discussed in the text, the 1991 Amendments (1) re-
vised the burden of proof and the business necessity defense to disparate impact
discrimination claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994); (2) made it more difficult for
nonlitigants to challenge consent decrees, id. § 2000e-2(n); (3) clarified and
lengthened the statute of limitations on Title VII claims, id. § 2000e-5(e); and (4)
allowed more generous attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs, id. § 1988(b). For
an extended discussion of the Act's revisions to Title VII, see Robert Belton, The
Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921 (1993).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994).
45. Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45-46, 48-49 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-84, 586-87.
47. Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
Since the Act has been codified, this Article will refer generally to the United
States Code section (§ 2000e-2(m)), rather than the public law section (§ 107).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
49. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)).
50. Id.
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Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows a mixed-motive plaintiff to recover if
the defendant was motivated by prohibited characteristics in the em-
ployment decision regardless of the legitimate reasons that also justi-
fied the adverse action.5 2
IV. MIXING THE METAPHORS: MODEL INSTRUCTION 5.01
The committee charged with drafting the model civil jury instruc-
tions for Eighth Circuit district courts initially anticipated little diffi-
culty in formulating appropriate model instructions for employment
discrimination cases. This was due largely to the unavailability of
jury trials in Title VII cases when the project of drafting the instruc-
tions was first undertaken.5 3 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however,
with its provision for money damages and jury trials, was passed
while the Model Instructions were being formulated.54 The committee
attempted to reflect the 1991 Amendments in its suggested instruc-
tions. The result is Section Five, which contains model elements and
damages instructions in a variety of employment discrimination cases.
The committee covered claims of disparate treatment under Title
VII;55 disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act;56 race discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981;57 and
discrimination by public employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,58 with
special treatment for First Amendment claims.59 The committee rec-
ommends giving one "mixed motive/same decision" instruction in all
employment discrimination cases.60 It views this single instruction
approach as appropriate because of the 1991 Amendments in cases
brought under Title VII61 and preferable in cases brought under the
ADEA,62 section 1981,63 and section 1983.64
51. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
52. The 1991 Amendments essentially adopted the Eighth Circuit's pre-Price
Waterhouse approach to mixed-motives.
53. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 83 (introductory note).
54. Id. at 85.
55. Id. Instructions 5.00-5.05.
56. Id. Instructions 5.10-5.15.
57. Id. Instructions 5.20-5.25.
58. Id. Instructions 5.30-5.35.
59. Id. Instructions 5.71-5.75A. The Model Instructions also have reserved sections
for other employment claims. See id. Instructions 5.40-5.49 (reserved for "sexual
harassment" cases); id. Instructions 5.50-5.69 (reserved for cases under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1995)); id. at 83 (in-
troductory note)(stating that the committee intended to develop instructions for
"disparate impact" claims).
60. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 86 (introductory note).
61. Id. at 86 n.2.
62. See id. Instruction 5.11 & cmt.; id. Instruction 5.91 & cmt. The view that the
ADEA has been left unaltered by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not universal.
Compare Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 n.10, 779 n.13 (3d Cir.
1994)(analyzing ADEA as ifit was modified by the Civil Rights Act), and Tyler v.
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The single charge the committee proffers for use in Title VII dispa-
rate treatment claims is contained in Model Instruction 5.01:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if all of the following elements have been
proved by the preponderance 6 5 of the evidence:
First, defendant discharged 6 6 plaintiff; and
Second, plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in defendant's decision.
If either of the above elements has not been proved by the preponderance of
the evidence, your verdict must be for defendant and you need not proceed
further in considering this claim. 6 7
The comments to Instruction 5.01 assert that "[u]nder the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,... the plaintiff prevails on the issue of liability if he or
she shows that discrimination was a 'motivating factor' in the chal-
lenged employment decision."6 8
If the defendant presents evidence that legitimate factors alone
would have justified discharge, the committee recommends giving In-
struction 5.01A: "If you find in favor of plaintiff under Instruction __,
then you must answer the following question in the verdict form: Has
it been proved by the preponderance of the evidence that defendant
would have discharged plaintiff regardless of her sex?"6 9
The comments to this instruction explain that
[i]f a plaintiff prevails on the issue of liability by showing that discrimination
was a "motivating factor," the defendant nevertheless may avoid an award of
damages or reinstatement by showing that it would have taken the same ac-
tion in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. This instruction is
designed to submit this "same decision" issue to the jury.7 0
The committee's reading of both Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Amendments is fundamentally flawed. That misunderstanding re-
sulted in a set of model jury charges that constitute plain error under
the law of the Eighth Circuit and most other jurisdictions.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992)(same), with DeMarco
v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993)("We see no basis for con-
cluding that the new Title VII standard applies to the ADEA, since Congress
could have amended the ADEA along with Title VII, but did not."). This question
is beyond the scope of this Article. For an extended discussion of the issue, see
Eglit, supra note 8. Because of this uncertainty, this Article rarely will cite cases
brought under the ADEA, and when it does so, the cause of action is indicated
parenthetically.
63. See MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, Instruction 5.11 & cmt.; id. Instruction
5.91 & cmt.
64. See id. Instruction 5.31 & cmt.; id. Instruction 5.91 & cmt.
65. The committee directs the court to use language that corresponds with the bur-
den of proof instruction given. Id. Instruction 5.01, at 89 n.4.
66. This language can be modified to accommodate the plaintiffs allegations (failure
to hire, failure to promote or demote). See id. at 89 n.2.
67. Id. Instruction 5.01.
68. Id. Instruction 5.01 cmt.
69. Id. Instruction 5.01A.
70. Id. Instruction 5.01A cmt.
[Vol. 76:900910
TITLE VII JURY INSTRUCTIONS
V. WHY THE MODEL INSTRUCTIONS ARE WRONG
Initially it is clear that the committee's use of "a motivating factor"
gives plaintiffs in all Title VII cases a more lenient burden. There is a
world of legal difference between proving that something is "a moti-
vating factor" and proving it is "the motivating factor." This is not an
esoteric distinction; rather, it is a difference well within the common
sense understanding of ajuror.7 X If a characteristic (say, insubordina-
tion) was one reason for an employment decision, the implication is
that there must have been others (say, national origin) also motivat-
ing the result. For this reason, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has held that the exact language used by the Model
Instructions is inappropriate in pretext claims.
Foster v. University of Arkansas7 2 was heard by an Eighth Circuit
panel just before the 1991 Amendments went into effect.7 3 The plain-
tiff argued that the pretext jury instruction given at trial was errone-
ous because it directed the jury to find for the plaintiff if they found
that "race was the determining factor in his termination."74 The
plaintiff wanted an instruction directing the jury to find in his favor if
"'race was 'a determining factor,' not 'the determining factor.'" 7 5 The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument, concluding that "[i]f Foster
[was] correct, a pretext claim would become indistinguishable from a
mixed-motive claim. If race is only a determining factor, there can be
others-and then, by definition the case involves mixed motives."76
Similarly, in Williams v. Fermenta Animal Health Co.,77 the court
held that the district court's use of an instruction using the phrase "a
determining factor" was in fact a mixed-motive instruction, and there-
fore the plaintiff could not complain that the district court had failed
to give her a mixed-motive instruction.78 Thus, the Model Instruc-
tions' use of "a motivating factor" gives all disparate treatment plain-
tiffs the benefit of the more lenient mixed-motive burden. In effect,
the Model Instructions abrogate the pretext metaphor.
71. For example, say a prospective home buyer looks at a house and then discovers
the structure is not insulated. That flaw (at least during a Nebraska winter)
likely will be the factor motivating the buyer's decision not to purchase the house.
But, what if the same house also was painted a color the purchaser did not like?
Describing the lack of insulation as a factor implies that color also influenced the
buyer's decision.
72. 938 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1991).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Note that the effective date of Civil Rights Act of
1991 is November 11, 1991. Foster was decided July 5, 1991.
74. Foster v. University of Ark., 938 F.2d 111, 115 (8th Cir. 1991).
75. Id. (first emphasis in original)(other emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 984 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 265.
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A second problem with the Model Instructions is its failure to rec-
ognize the legal significance of shifting the burden of persuasion, as
opposed to the burden of production. In a mixed-motive case, the risk
of nonpersuasion is on the defendant.79 The result of the Model In-
structions' approach is that if a plaintiff shows the prohibited criteria
was "a motivating factor" in the employment decision, apparently no
matter how slight, the plaintiff will be able to place the risk of nonper-
suasion on the defendant.8 0 The Supreme Court justified placing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant in Price Waterhouse because
mixed-motive plaintiffs were required to make a heightened showing
of discriminatory purpose in mixed-motive cases. The Model Instruc-
tions ignore the heightened evidentiary showing required by the
Supreme Court after Price Waterhouse as a predicate to mixed-motive
treatment.8 1
The committee attempted to justify this departure from post-Price
Waterhouse case law in a number of ways. First, the committee ar-
gued that the 1991 Act was "expressly mandating a motivating factor/
same decision format."8 2 The committee misconstrues the statute on
this point. The legislative history of the 1991 Amendments demon-
strates that Congress enacted § 107 solely to overrule the part of Price
Waterhouse that allowed an employer to avoid all liability by prevail-
ing on the causation defense.8 3 The House Report accompanying the
1991 Amendments noted that the new section "overrules one aspect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse."84 Later, the re-
port explained that § 107 will apply "[f]or example, where two in-
dependent contributing factors, one discriminatory and the other
nondiscriminatory, were present."85 It is clear from these reports that
Congress did not see § 107 as a fundamental reorganization of all dis-
parate treatment claims under Title VII, but as a modification of one
aspect of claims brought under the mixed-motives metaphor. Con-
gress changed only the damages available in the subclass of mixed-
motive discrimination claims in which the defendant had successfully
mounted a Price Waterhouse defense.
79. See Wolffv. Brown, 128 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1997)("Both Price Waterhouse and
the new statute [i.e., the 1991 Civil Rights Act] expressly place th[e] burden [of
persuasion] on the employer.").
80. See James H. Coil HI & Amy Weinstein, Past Sins or Future Transgressions: The
Debate over Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act, 18 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 5, 10 (1992).
81. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
82. MODEL INsTRUCTIONs, supra note 4, at 85 (introductory note).
83. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45-46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 583-84.
84. Id. at 48, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586 (emphasis added).
85. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 19 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAA.N. 694, 712.
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Additional rationales offered by the committee in support of col-
lapsing the pretext and mixed-motive metaphors focus on the practical
difficulties presented by both models. The committee observed that
"there would be a significant difficulty in deciding how to classify a
given case" if it recognized both metaphors.8 6 It also cited uncertainty
over what constituted direct evidence sufficient to warrant mixed-mo-
tive treatment.8 7 The committee expressed skepticism about the
value of classifying pretext and mixed-motive discrimination based on
the direct evidence distinction, complaining that plaintiffs with
weaker claims might be able to produce direct evidence and thereby
"be entitled to an 'easier' burden of proof... under the pretext/mixed-
motive distinction."8 8 Moreover, the committee was reluctant to force
district courts to decide whether a given case alleged pretext or mixed-
motive discrimination because the distinction between the two meta-
phors "would be... potentially dispositive [given the] difference in the
burden of persuasion contained in these [jury] instructions."8 9
Some concerns identified by the committee are valid. Difficult
questions of application arise when separating the mixed-motive and
pretext metaphors. These difficulties, however, do not justify dis-
torting congressional directives and ignoring binding precedent.
Furthermore, the committee itself recognizes that the mixed-mo-
tive burden of proof is "easier"90 and acknowledges that the different
instructions are "potentially dispositive."9g It is difficult to under-
stand how these concerns justify allowing all plaintiffs the more leni-
ent mixed-motive instruction. Simply because it is difficult to
separate deserving plaintiffs from undeserving ones does not justify
punishing all disparate treatment defendants.
Moreover, the Model Instructions' approach creates its own set of
application problems. Under this formulation, a defendant does not
know if or when it will have to carry the burden of persuading a jury
that it would have made the same decision even if the prohibited fac-
tor had not been considered. Case preparation and discovery is diffi-
cult for both parties since the exact theory of liability is never settled.
This change is even more striking since under the new Act, even if the
employer prevails on a same-decision defense, the plaintiff may still
recover attorney fees and receive other relief.92 The Model Instruc-
tions also make it difficult for district courts to determine when the
plaintiff has made a case under § 2000e-2(m) (and thus possibly enti-
86. MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 84 (introductory note).
87. Id. at 85.
88. Id. at 85 n.1.
89. Id. at 84.
90. Id. at 85 n.1.
91. Id. at 84.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
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tled only to the limited remedies of § 2000e-5(g)) or under the pretext
model of discrimination (thus entitled to full damages under the 1991
Act). Congress did not anticipate this effect when passing the 1991
Amendments. Finally, and most importantly to courts and litigants in
the Eighth Circuit, this is not an interpretation endorsed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit or by the major-
ity of other federal courts.
VI. APPLYING THE METAPHORS: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1991
A. United States Supreme Court Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court, in its only consideration of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, held that the 1991 Amendments do not apply
retroactively to pre-1991 conduct.9 3 The Landgraf case did not inter-
pret § 2000e-2(m), yet the Supreme Court indicated that it read that
provision to apply only to mixed-motive claims. The Court observed
that § 2000e-2(m) "responds to Price Waterhouse .. .by setting forth
standards applicable in 'mixed motive' cases."94 Thus, unlike the
Model Instructions, the Supreme Court does not interpret § 2000e-
2(m) as collapsing mixed-motive and pretext into one claim.
B. Interpretations by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Since the 1991 Amendments do not apply to pre-1991 conduct, 95
judicial interpretation of the Amendments is just starting to emerge.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet directly addressed
whether the mixed-motive/pretext distinction survived the 1991
Amendments. 9 6 There are strong indications, however, that the ap-
peals court still regards the distinction as viable. In Brown v. Polk
County,97 the en banc court tacitly recognized the continuing distinc-
tion between pretext and mixed-motive discrimination. It held that
93. Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244,252 (1994)(finding no retroactive appli-
cation of § 101 and § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
94. Id. at 251.
95. See id. at 252. See also Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1216, 1218-
20 (8th Cir. 1997)(finding no retroactive application of § 101 and § 102 of Civil
Rights Act of 1991 in a "straddle" claim alleging acts taken both before and after
1991); Preston v. Virginia ex rel New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 208
(4th Cir. 1994)(finding no retroactive application of § 107 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1993)(finding no retro-
active application of § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
96. Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791, 793 n.4 (8th Cir. 1992)(withholding judgment on
the impact that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had on a pretext plaintiffs entitle-
ment to a mixed-motive instruction).
97. 37 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994), affd en banc, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).
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when a plaintiff proves that his religion was "'a factor' in [the] decision
to fire [him, he has] presented enough evidence to require the applica-
tion of a 'mixed-motives' analysis."9 8
Kriss v. Sprint Communications Co.s9 involved a plaintiff's claim
that her 1990 termination violated Title VII. The court held that the
district court had erred in applying the Price Waterhouse mixed-mo-
tive rubric to the case instead of a McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis. 0 0
In Sargent v. Paul,101 the plaintiff claimed she had presented a
mixed-motive claim about which the jury should have been instructed.
The court first explained the heightened evidentiary showing a plain-
tiff must make to qualify as a dual motivation claim:
The plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motives analysis under Price Waterhouse if
(1) the employer concedes that [gender] was a discernible factor, but not a
motivating one, for the employment decision or (2) the trial court finds that a
discriminatory reason was a discernible factor in the employer's decision-mak-
ing process. 102
The court then held that the plaintiff had failed to meet either of these
predicates, and therefore was properly denied Price Waterhouse
analysis. 0 3
In Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.,i0 4 the plaintiff
challenged her 1987 termination.i0 5 In Stacks I, the court again be-
gan by observing the heavier evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must
carry before being entitled to mixed-motive treatment.
A plaintiff in a gender discrimination case can proceed under two alterna-
tive theories. If the plaintiff can demonstrate that an illegitimate criterion
was a motivating factor in the employment decision, the burden shifting
formula set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins... is applied....
If the plaintiff is unable to produce evidence that directly reflects the use of
an illegitimate criterion in the challenged decision, the employee may proceed
under the now-familiar three-step analytical framework described in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green .... 106
98. Brown v. Polk County, 37 F.3d 650, 657 (8th Cir. 1994)(citations omitted).
99. 58 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 1281-82. The court held that the plaintiff also would not have prevailed
under McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 1282-83.
101. 16 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 1994).
102. Id. at 948.
103. Id.
104. 996 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1993)(per curiam), appeal after remand, 27 F.3d 1316 (8th
Cir. 1994).
105. Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir.
1994).
106. Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 996 F.2d 200, 201-02 (8th Cir.
1993)(per curiam)(internal citations, footnotes, and quotations omitted), appeal
after remand, 27 F.3d 1316 (8th Cir. 1994).
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The court then held that a trial court is required to make an explicit
finding as to whether a case qualified for mixed-motive analysis.10 7
The court described the distinction as "crucial"1 0 and remanded, di-
recting the trial court to make "specific findings concerning whether
[the plaintiff] had demonstrated that her gender was a motivating fac-
tor in the challenged employment decision, and, if so, whether [the
defendant] met its burden to demonstrate it would have made the
same decision anyway."1 0 9
These cases, if nothing else, show that the Model Instructions
should not be used in cases involving pre-1991 conduct. Recently, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the mixed-motive/pretext dis-
tinction to post-1991 conduct, casting serious doubt on Model Instruc-
tions 5.01 and 5.01A in all Title VII cases. In Title VII dual-
motivation cases involving post-1991 conduct, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has continued to require a heightened evidentiary
showing before applying the mixed-motive metaphor.1 1 0
In Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co.,"' the plaintiff alleged sexual
harassment and retaliatory and discriminatory discharge based on
events occurring in 1991 and 1992. After the district court granted
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. On appeal after remand, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief
on her mixed-motive claim. See Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc.,
27 F.3d 1316 (8th Cir. 1994).
110. The Eighth Circuit has applied the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive
claims in numerous cases brought under the ADEA since the 1991 Amendments.
See, e.g., Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich., Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 452 (8th
Cir. 1997)(holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to mixed-motive analysis in
his age retaliation claims because he failed to present direct evidence in support
of those claims); Buchholz v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 120 F.3d 146, 149 (8th Cir.
1997)(holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to mixed-motive jury instruc-
tions without evidence linking the discriminatory animus and the challenged de-
cision); Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 609 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997)(stating
that "it is important to recognize at the outset that we are dealing with a pretext
case, not a case of mixed motives"); Berg v. Bruce, 112 F.3d 322, 328 (8th Cir.
1997)(holding that the plaintiffs failure to show direct evidence of age-based ani-
mus "is fatal to her claim that this case should be analyzed as a mixed motives
case"); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836 n.1 (8th Cir. 1997)(en banc)("It is
imperative to recognize that under the facts submitted, this is not a ... mixed-
motive case.., where different rules apply"); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 111
F.3d 64, 65-66 (8th Cir. 1997)(holding that plaintiffs must produce direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent before being entitled to Price Waterhouse analy-
sis). Since the Model Instructions concede that the distinction between single
and dual motivation instructions survives under the ADEA, the Model Instruc-
tions conform with these cases (although the Model Instructions' recommended
unified standard instructions in ADEA cases clearly are incorrect). Yet, the
court's careful line-drawing between mixed-motive and pretext in the ADEA con-
text reveals its recognition that the two claims are in fact distinct and may indi-
cate its commitment to continuing the distinction in Title VII claims.
111. 49 F.3d 466 (8th Cir. 1995).
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summary judgment to the defendants, the plaintiff appealed, arguing
that the district court should have applied the mixed-motives meta-
phor under Price Waterhouse."i2 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision because the plaintiff had made no heightened
evidentiary showing entitling her to mixed-motive treatment."i 3
Likewise, in Gartman v. Gencorp Inc.,ii4 the challenged employ-
ment decision was made in 1993."15 After ajury awarded the plaintiff
damages under the 1991 Amendments, the defendant appealed, claim-
ing the district court had erred as a matter of law in denying a defense
motion for summary judgment.lie The court of appeals agreed and
reversed the jury award. In doing so, the court first examined the
plaintiffs evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework, conclud-
ing that the defendant's pretext argument failed.1i 7 The court then
examined the plaintiffs claims under the Price Waterhouse analysis.
The court found that the plaintiff could not succeed under the Price
Waterhouse rubric either because "from this evidence a jury could not
reasonably infer that a discriminatory attitude was a motivating fac-
tor" in the employment decision."i 8
Most recently, in Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Missouri Community
Treatment Center,1 19 the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court's
grant of summary judgement in a case alleging only post-1991 dis-
crimination. The appeals court eschewed the terms "mixed-motive"
and "pretext," relying instead on the labels "direct evidence analysis"
and "indirect analysis."' 20 Nevertheless, the court held that the plain-
tiffs failure to present direct evidence of racial discrimination was fa-
tal to her claims under the Price Waterhouse paradigm.' 2 ' Although
the court expressly withheld comment on the impact of the 1991
Amendments to a Price Waterhouse claim,122 its holding is a clear
statement that the distinction between mixed-motive and pretext the-
ories of recovery survive the 1991 Amendments.
Cram, Gartman, and Rivers-Frison indicate that the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals continues to recognize the mixed-motive meta-
phor as a claim separate from the pretext metaphor even after the
112. Id. at 471.
113. Id. Interestingly, in a footnote the court claimed it was relying on cases brought
under the ADEA in a Title VII mixed-motive opinion, but explained that "we turn
to cases concerning both statutes for guidance." Id. at 471 n.6.
114. 120 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1997).
115. Id. at 129 (involving plaintiffs argument that her 1993 transfer to another plant
constituted constructive discharge).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 131.
118. Id.
119. 133 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 1998).
120. Id. at 619.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 619 n.3.
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1991 Civil Rights Amendments. Thus, it is doubtful that Model In-
struction 5.01 correctly states the law of the Eighth Circuit. In contin-
uing to recognize pretext and mixed-motive claims as analytically and
factually distinct, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joins the major-
ity of its sibling circuits' interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
C. Interpretations by Other Circuit Courts of Appeals
Only one United States Court of Appeals has read the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 as merging mixed-motive and pretext discrimination
claims. In O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,123 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "Title VII rejects any such distinction [between
pretext and mixed-motive cases]. Since Congress passed the 1991
Civil Rights Act, liability in mixed-motive cases is deemed established
once the employee shows that a discriminatory criterion was a moti-
vating factor only in the employer's decision."124 This statement was
made, however, without any meaningful discussion of the statute, and
in the context of deciding what standard of proof governed an em-
ployer's use of after-acquired evidence.125 In dissent, Judge Fletcher
argued that the majority had erroneously applied mixed-motive prece-
dent to an after-acquired evidence case.' 2 6
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled
on the mixed-motives/pretext distinction,127 one district court within
that circuit has concluded that the two claims have been merged. In
Allen v. City of Athens,12s the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama reasoned that "[t]he language of
§ 2000e-2(m) speaks in plain, unambiguous terms, and makes no dis-
tinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. All that is re-
quired to trigger liability under § 2000e-2(m) is that the plaintiff
'demonstrate' that discrimination was a 'motivating factor' in the chal-
lenged employment decision."129 The court's holding is somewhat
123. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996). O'Day is an ADEA case and as such may be unaf-
fected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in O'Day draws this distinction. O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
124. ODay v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1996).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 767 (Fletcher, J., dissenting)(stating that "mixed-motive cases are not ap-
plicable in the after-acquired evidence context").
127. But see Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 (11th Cir.
1996)(applying § 2000e-2(m) after the plaintiff had presented direct evidence of
discrimination).
128. 937 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
129. Id. at 1540. See also Salter v. Douglas MacArthur State Tech. College, 929 F.
Supp. 1470, 1477 n.34 (M.D. Ala. 1996)(applying § 2000e-2(m) even though the
plaintiff did not attempt to prove discrimination through direct evidence); Hearn
v. General Elec. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1486, 1497-99 (M.D. Ala. 1996)(discussing the
conflict between the Eleventh Circuit's direct evidence cases and § 2000e-2(m)).
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muddled, however, because immediately after reaching this conclu-
sion, it proceeded to examine the plaintiffs case for direct evidence,13 0
and finding none, analyzed the plaintiffs evidence under McDonnell
Douglas.13 '
These two jurisdictions, however, are the only federal courts that
have read the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in accord with the Model In-
structions' interpretation. The majority of courts have concluded that
the distinction between mixed-motives and pretext discrimination
claims has survived-and even has been strengthened by-the 1991
Amendments.
One of the first courts to consider the question was the Fourth Cir-
cuit. In Fuller v. Phipps,132 a race discrimination plaintiff appealed
the trial court's refusal to give a dual motivation instruction to the
jury deciding his pretext claim. He argued that § 2000e-2(m) applied
in all cases, not just those in which the plaintiff had presented direct
evidence of discrimination.
The court began its consideration of this argument by observing
that "t]he distinction [between mixed-motive and pretext claims] is
critical, because plaintiffs enjoy more favorable standards of liability
in mixed-motive cases, and this is even more so after the Civil Rights
Act of 1991."133 The court explained that
[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the Price Waterhouse scheme, making
mixed-motive treatment more favorable to plaintiffs. Under Section 107 of the
Act, an employer can no longer avoid liability by proving that it would have
made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons. Instead, liability now
attaches whenever race "was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m).13 4
The Fuller court then held that § 2000e-2(m) did not entitle all Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs to this more advantageous scheme, but only those
who presented direct evidence of discrimination.
To earn a mixed-motive instruction in accordance with the standards set
forth in Section 107, a plaintiff must satisfy the evidentiary burden necessary
to make out a mixed-motive case. This requires direct evidence that deci-
sionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion.
Moreover, [n]ot all evidence that is probative of discrimination will entitle the
plaintiff to a [mixed-motive] charge. Otherwise, any plaintiff who is able to
establish a prima facie showing in a pretext case would qualify for a mixed-
motive instruction, conflating the two categories of cases and subverting the
Supreme Court's efforts to distinguish the two theories.13 5
The court when on to conclude that
130. Allen v. City of Athens, 937 F. Supp 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
131. Id. at 1544-46.
132. 67 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 1141 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 1142.
135. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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Fuller has misconstrued the scope of Section 107 when he seeks an instruction
under that provision: Section 107 was intended to benefit plaintiffs in mixed-
motive cases; it has nothing to say about the analysis in pretext cases such as
this one.... Moreover, the language of Section 107 contemplates a mixed-
motive setting, specifically referring to situations in which the plaintiff dem-
onstrates that an illicit consideration has influenced the employment decision
and in which other factors may also have played a role.... Consequently,
only those plaintiffs who satisfy the evidentiary burden entitling them to
mixed-motive treatment can qualify for an instruction under Section 107.136
The Fourth Circuit is not alone. The First,13 7 Second,138 and Sev-
enth139 Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the distinction be-
tween the mixed-motives and pretext metaphors continues after the
1991 Amendments.140 In Fields v. New York State Office of Mental
Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, the Second Circuit began
its treatment of the issue by describing the schism between mixed-
motive and pretext claims as "a distinction that underlies all Title VII
cases."14 1 In Fields, the plaintiff contended "that the wording of sec-
tion 107(a), by recognizing that an impermissible reason might be one
of multiple factors for an adverse employment decision, indicates that
Congress intended to treat all cases governed by the 1991 Act as dual
motivation cases."14 2 The court flatly rejected this argument. After
noting that the legislative history fails to support the sweeping read-
ing of § 107(a) proposed by the plaintiff, the court concluded that
[t]hough section 107(b) of the 1991 Act modifies Price Waterhouse by alter-
ing the legal consequence of a successful showing by the defendant on its af-
firmative defense, the Act is silent on the separate and distinct question of
when this defense must be submitted to the jury .... [Tihe distinction be-
tween "dual motivation" and "substantial motivation" jury instructions sur-
vives the 1991 Act. 1 4 3
The weight of authority, including decisions in the Eighth Circuit,
supports the conclusion that there is a difference between mixed-mo-
tive and pretext discrimination claims. By failing to recognize these
136. Id. at 1143-44 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).
137. See Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 750 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1996);
Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
138. See Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Dis-
abilities, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997).
139. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1350 (7th Cir.
1995).
140. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reserved ruling on
this question. See Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 331 n.12 (5th Cir.
1994). The Third Circuit also has expressly left open the question whether a "de-
terminative factor" instruction should be given in a pretext case after the 1991
Act. Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1994). It has indi-
cated, however, an initial disposition to eliminate the distinction between mixed-
motive and pretext discrimination. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 935 n.29 (3d Cir. 1997).
141. 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997).
142. Id. at 123.
143. Id. at 124 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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differences, the Model Instructions fail to accurately state the law of
the Eighth Circuit as well as most other circuits.
VII. RESTORING THE PRETEXT METAPHOR
By now it should be clear that Model Instruction 5.01 simply fails
to accurately state the law of the Eighth Circuit. Nonetheless, many
of the concerns used by the committee to justify its failure to draft
separate instructions for each metaphor are legitimate. Fortunately,
careful analysis of the 1991 Amendments avoids the problems identi-
fied by the committee while still maintaining the balance between
mixed-motive and pretext plaintiffs.
The solution lies in Congress' express limitation of the remedies
available under the modified mixed-motive metaphor. Section 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) allows the court to grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
and attorney's fees and costs if the defendant makes a same-decision
defense.1 44 These remedies are all equitable and therefore within the
power of the court alone.145 When a plaintiff seeks both legal and eq-
uitable remedies, the jury serves as the fact-finder for all common is-
sues of fact, but does not render a verdict on the equitable issues.1 46
The judge then rules on the equitable claims, but is bound by the
jury's determinations regarding common issues of fact.14 7
So the practical effect of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) is that the jury does not
have to be instructed on a § 2000e-2(m) claim at all. Plaintiffs nor-
mally will not seek only declaratory relief and attorney fees; instead,
they will seek the full scope of relief available under the 1991 Amend-
ments. Thus, the jury should be instructed that the prohibited charac-
teristic must be proven as the motivating factor for the employment
decision. A formula jury charge could read as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff on her gender discrimination claim if all the
following elements have been proved by the preponderance of the evidence:
First, defendant discharged plaintiff, and
Second, plaintiffs gender was the determining factor in defendant's decision.
You may find gender was the determining factor if you find that defendant's
stated reasons for its decision are not the true reasons but are a pretext to
hide discriminatory motivation. If any of the above elements have not been
proved by the greater weight of the evidence, your verdict must be for
defendant.
This instruction, or one like it, properly focuses the jury on the
question of the real reason for the adverse employment action, which
is the ultimate question in a pretext claim.1 48
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994).
145. LAw OF REMIES § 6.10(6) (Dan B. Dobbs, ed., 2d ed. 1993).
146. See Dairy Queen, Inc., v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
147. See Brownlee v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 921 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1990).
148. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 520-21 (1993); Aucutt v. Six
Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996).
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If the jury returns a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff can still
prevail on a § 2000e-2(m) claim. The court would analyze this claim
separately, first examining the plaintiffs submissions to see ff she
meets the heightened showing required for mixed-motive treatment.
If so, the court sitting in equity would have to determine whether the
plaintiff had established that the prohibited characteristic was a moti-
vating factor, even if it was not the motivating factor. The court then
must determine whether the defendant successfully established that
it would have made the same decision even without considering the
prohibited characteristic. If the employer fails to carry the burden of
persuasion on this issue, the court could grant appropriate relief
under the 1991 Amendments. If the employer successfully proves this
same-decision defense, the court still could award the equitable reme-
dies provided in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
This reading of the Act has several advantages. First, the district
court need not determine before a jury trial whether the plaintiff has
adduced direct evidence of discrimination. It thus allays the commit-
tee's concern that the district court's pretrial evidentiary analysis
would determine the outcome before a jury is even impaneled. Sec-
ond, separate jury instructions attempting to articulate the different
burdens of persuasion in the mixed-motive and pretext metaphors are
unnecessary. Since the equitable claims are determined by the court,
there is no reason to instruct the jury about them. Third, consistent
with the congressional mandate, plaintiffs with evidence of discrimi-
natory animus but without evidence of causation can still recover the
limited remedies prescribed by § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), and district
courts will maintain the required discretionary control over this relief.
Finally, consistent with Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent,
the two metaphors for disparate treatment discrimination, with their
different burden-shifting approaches, remain distinct.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Standardized forms like the Model Instructions are useful tools for
both courts and counsel. Pattern instructions, however, are no substi-
tute for careful legal research and analysis. Particularly in rapidly
evolving areas of the law-like employment discrimination-any
standardized articulation of the law requires careful scrutiny.
By reviewing the disparate treatment metaphors of pretext and
mixed-motive discrimination, examining the Model Instructions' pat-
tern charge for Title VII disparate treatment claims, and comparing
that charge to the law of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, this
Article demonstrates that Model Instruction 5.01 fails to accurately
reflect the law of the Eighth Circuit. At the least, trial courts and
counsel should no longer use Model Instruction 5.01 in Title VII dispa-
rate treatment cases.
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This Article also offers an alternative interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. This construction of the Act addresses the commit-
tee's practical concerns, while remaining faithful to precedent and
congressional intent by recognizing the continuing distinction be-
tween pretext and mixed-motive claims.
Although the rising tide of employment discrimination litigation is
not likely to ebb soon, careful analysis by courts and counsel can in-
sure that juries deciding Title VII claims are properly instructed on
the plaintiffs claims. This modification may not stem the tide of em-
ployment cases faced by district courts of the Eighth Circuit, but it at
least will assure that these courts do not face an additional wave of
cases requiring retrial for proper jury instructions.
